The Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, Islamic Sainthood, and Religion in Modern Times*

SEAN FOLEY
Middle Tennessee State University

Islam has been reborn . . . because of people’s conviction that Islam can provide a valid spiritual foundation to their lives. Such a foundation seems to have eluded . . . Europe, despite its enduring political and economic power.

—Pope Benedict XVI,
“The Spiritual Roots of Europe: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow” 1

So many disciples in France
They cannot be counted
Wherever you go they are sharing in
The study of Bamba 2

* An earlier version of this article was read to the Department of Religious Studies at Arizona State University in January 2006. The author thanks John Voll, York Norman, Jerry Bentley, and an anonymous reader for their helpful comments for improving the paper. In addition, he thanks members of the Naqshbandi order for their hospitality as well as Hamid Algar and Shahab Mesbahi for their timely help with one of Shaykh Khalid’s poems. Finally, the author thanks Ahmad Barakat and Mufid Yüksel for their assistance—both during and after his time researching in the Middle East.


2 N’Dour is singing about Amodou Bamba. Bamba was a nineteenth-century West-African Muslim scholar who founded the Muridiyya Sufi order. He is widely regarded as a Muslim saint.
Disciples are also in Casamance. They are all around the world.
When they celebrate him at mággal
All are welcome.

—Youssou N’Dour,
“Touba Daru Salaam”

In January 2002, I was researching the life of a leading nineteenth-century Muslim saint and religious scholar, Shaykh Khalid Naqshbandi (1776–1826), in Damascus, Syria, and was invited to attend the weekly dhikr (the ritual remembering of God) at the home of Shaykh Nazim al-Qubrusi. Shaykh Nazim has thousands of adherents around the world: he is the most significant contemporary follower of Shaykh Khalid and a leading figure within Shaykh Khalid’s Sufi brotherhood or order (tariqa; pl. turuq): the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya. When I arrived at the home, I was swiftly escorted into a large, carpeted room filled with dozens of men of different ages and nationalities huddled around Nazim. I was then formally introduced to the shaykh, who asked me in Arabic about my research on Shaykh Khalid. After I responded, Nazim switched into English. He explained that it was the only language that everyone present, some of whom were European and American converts to Islam, could understand. As he spoke, I noticed that one of Nazim’s aides had begun to videotape his conversation with me—possibly to be posted on his Web site and included in one of the many videocassettes and CDs sold to his followers.

3 Casamance is a region of Senegal.
5 His gesture may have been a courtesy to me: conducting the discussion in the language in which I felt most at ease. My discussion with Nazim (and others that I witnessed among him and his followers) was reminiscent of sohbet (or “dialogue”), a devotional practice among Sufi Muslims which Brian Silverstein has documented in Turkey. For more on sohbet, see Brian Silverstein, “Disciplines Presence in Modern Turkey: Discourse, Companionship, and the Mass Mediation of Islamic Practice,” Cultural Anthropology 23, no. 1 (2008): 118–153.
6 For more on Shaykh Nazim and these products, see http://www.naqshbandi.org. Dozens of videos featuring Shaykh Nazim are also available on YouTube. Another Naqshbandi Shaykh who made extensive use of the Internet is the late Ahmad Kaftaru (1915–2004). Kaftaru was the most senior religious official in Syria for many years and was among the most visible religious figures in the Middle East. For more on Kaftaru’s use of the Internet, see http://www.abunour.net. This Web site maintains separate pages in Turkish, Spanish, English, French, Japanese, and Arabic.
After my discussion with Nazim, I was besieged by at least a dozen men who praised me for my audience with Nazim and peppered me with questions about my conversation with him. Many of these men also attempted to sit or stand next to me and touch my back or arms, or even put their arms around my shoulders. At first, I assumed that these men were enthusiastic followers of Nazim who were displaying Arab “social” norms: in Syria and other Arab societies, heterosexual men hold hands, lock arms, kiss one another on the cheeks, and engage in more direct physical interaction in public than their American counterparts. But when one of the men, a computer programmer, asked if Nazim touched my backpack, I understood what was happening: the men believed that Shaykh Nazim—like Shaykh Khalid before him—was a Muslim saint who could confer baraka, or blessings from God, onto anyone who interacted with him. By touching me or anything else that had made contact with Nazim, including my backpack, they believed that they could benefit from the baraka that God conferred to humanity through Nazim.

My exchange with the followers of Shaykh Nazim and the fervor of their belief in his powers illustrate the vitality of a system of belief in the Muslim tradition which has existed for centuries: saint veneration accompanied by belief in otherworldly powers. At first glance, the continued strength of this aspect of the Muslim tradition comes as a surprise because for years it was accepted among Western scholars that Sufi brotherhoods, spirituality, and other traditional elements of Muslim culture would eventually disappear as significant elements of religious or social experience. Instead, new categories of Muslim activists and organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were to dominate the future, participate in the worldwide resurgence of religion, and figure in the concomitant battle for the soul of Islam. For most Western scholars, this battle is framed as a struggle in which progressive Muslims, who wish to modernize their societies, fight Osama bin Laden and other Jihadists, who seek to impose a tyrannical and medieval form of Islam on Muslims.

This mode of analysis implicitly asserts that al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other similar organizations with membership in the hundreds are more important to Muslim societies than Shaykh Nazim or other senior Sufi leaders, who head networks with thousands or millions of active participants. The mode of analysis also overlooks the

---

power embedded in the spirituality of Islam, especially vis-à-vis the Western tradition—a power recently commented on by the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Benedict XVI. He argues in “The Spiritual Roots of Europe” that the rise of Western, modern/technological societies led to the rebirth of Islam. In his eyes, the principal factor in Islam’s resurgence was people’s conviction that it “can provide a valid spiritual foundation to their lives.” Such a foundation, he adds, eludes modern, Western culture, which denies its religious and moral heritage. Consequently, modern, Western culture—despite its economic and political power—has been abandoned for Islam, which provides “higher” truths about the universe and about each person’s place in that universe.

In this article, I will propose a new framework for understanding Muslim saints and their presence in the contemporary history of Muslim societies by analyzing Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya. My approach reflects two insights: the first deals with the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya. The Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya has unified disparate communities behind an agenda of reform in a manner analogous to contemporary social movements in Europe and North America such as the Green Party, the Moral Majority, or the Civil Rights Movement. This similarity should come as no surprise. Halil İnalçık, a leading Turkish historian of the Ottoman Empire, observes that a tariqa is an “institution” that translates the needs, aims, and ideals of Muslims in particular settings into “a social organization or movement.”

Moreover, Quintan Wiktorowicz’s recent collection of essays, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, has shown the value of social movement theory—an interdisciplinary study that seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests itself, and its consequences—for understanding such movements in specifically Muslim societies. Throughout Wiktorowicz’s book, authors in both the humanities and social sciences discuss the process by which Muslim social movements define their goals, win support, and effect social change in twenty-first-century Muslim states.

My article expands on the insights of Wiktorowicz’s volume by applying social movement theory, for the first time, to a specific Sunni Muslim movement originating in the nineteenth century—a move-

---

9 Ibid.
ment that appealed to thousands of Muslims across linguistic, cultural, and ethnic lines.

The second insight deals with Shaykh Khalid himself, who modified key aspects of his doctrine over time and emphasized different aspects of his identity and views to different audiences. His doctrine constantly focused on his personal appeal and identity, his promise to bring Islamic practice into line with the religion’s highest ideals, and his denial that the current moment is fully real. It also emphasized that the various crises afflicting modern Muslims reflected their misguided “devotion” to the temporal world, or *dunya* (or materiality), as opposed to the hereafter, or *din* (religious devotion). Although Khalid frequently asserted the continuity of his doctrines and his loyalty to previous figures in the Muslim tradition, the process of presenting his doctrines to different audiences often forced him to define his ideas in one context in a manner that undermined or contradicted his teachings elsewhere or undermined the teachings of the men whose ideas he claimed to uphold. Throughout his various shifts, Khalid also maintained a constant, subtle assertion of himself as a *wali*, or Muslim saint.

The chief sources for examining Shaykh Khalid’s body of teachings and doctrines, or “Way,” are his poetry and correspondence. Sources such as poetry and correspondence reveal the innermost desires of participants and their daily lives and show how they saw the world through their own eyes, on their own terms. These notions are important because Shaykh Khalid used his letters, like St. Paul, to guide his followers, many of whom he had never met or who lived at a great distance from him.

When we look at these sources in detail, we can see many instances

---

12 The term *dunya* is analogous to the way that American evangelical Christians use the phrase “the world, the flesh, and the devil.”

13 For Shaykh Khalid, the term *din* implied a way of life in devotion to God for which individuals would be judged and recompensed on Judgment Day. *Din* encompassed deeds, thoughts, practices, and the general character of a Muslim—all of which had to conform to a path that God had revealed to humanity through the Quran and the Sunna, the record of the actions and sayings of the prophet Muhammad.

of Shaykh Khalid’s intellectual flexibility and cases where he suspended the most basic of his teachings. One of his most frequently repeated teachings was that his followers had to maintain regular contact with him and inform him of all of their activities. Yet upon his arrival in Damascus he told his Baghdadi followers that he was too busy to correspond with them. When authorities in Istanbul objected to his followers’ long-established practice of locking the doors of the tariqa’s lodge during dhikr, Khalid promptly ordered the doors to remain open.

Other examples of Shaykh Khalid’s flexibility involve factors as varied as the proper role of women in the tariqa, his views of Christians and Jews, the legality of rebellion, adherents’ relationships with government officials, the size of the various branches of the tariqa, the penalties for violating the tariqa’s rules, and whether Khalid had the right to expel adherents from the tariqa.

Past approaches to Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya generally overlook these phenomena and portray him as a figure dedicated to defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire—which governed the Middle East and the Balkans from the fourteenth century until the end of World War I—against European imperialism. These approaches also emphasize Khalid’s exclusivist doctrines and desire to annihilate Christians, Jews, and Shias. Their conclusions rest primarily on hagiographies written by disciples, which often combine historic events with generically recurring themes and narrative structures.

I will make four key points. First, Sufi saints have had a key place in Muslim societies for centuries and reflect trends in religion and world history. Second, the influence of Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya rested on his ideological flexibility, appeal to multiple audiences, and emphasis on the hereafter. While it is true that Khalid may have employed bigoted views at certain points in his career, far

---

16 Sahib, Bughyat al-wajid, pp. 229–231, 246.
17 Ibid., pp. 123–124.
more critical to his success was his status as a Muslim saint and, most interestingly, his emphasis on the role of women in the tariqa. Third, the Naqshbandiya-Khalidiyya fulfilled the yearning among thousands of Europeans, Americans, and others in recent decades for a greater balance between spirituality and materialism than was seemingly possible in modern society. Fourth, the rapid spread of the Naqshbandiya-Khalidiyya and its doctrines over the last two hundred years raises important questions about how we classify postmodern movements in world history and track the development of religious movements over time. My discussion does not touch on Shia Islam since it confines saintly status only to imams, or the divinely appointed successors of Muhammad, and, to a lesser extent, to their relatives, or imamzada. Sunnis have recognized scores of individuals as saints up until the present day but the last, or twelfth imam, lived in the Middle Ages.19

Islam, Sainthood, and Western Scholarship

Though the terms “saint” and “sainthood” are used interchangeably to describe persons of exceptional merit and the status attained by them in Islam, it is important to remember that there is no Arabic word for either saint or sainthood. Nor does the Quran explicitly recognize saints or sainthood as an institution. Instead, Muslim discussions of sainthood stress exegesis of Qur’anic passages that discuss the “friends” of God (auliya’; singular wali) along with the hadith (sayings of the prophet Muhammad) that discuss auliyā’. Muslims also stress a broad definition of the term wali that incorporates two Qur’anic terms: wilaya (delegated power or authority) and walaya (closeness in the physical or the metaphorical sense to power, including personal status).20

Vincent Cornell argues that these two terms coexist “symbolically like yin and yang” and reflect a logic by which an individual “can only exercise authority over another by being close to one who bestows authority.”21 Because the Quran defines God as the ultimate source of authority, Cornell contends that it follows that the friends and protégés of God—much like those who are close to kings or other powerful people—benefit from their proximity to power and their ability to act as intermediaries. As intermediaries, protégés are also patrons: Muslims

21 Ibid., p. xix.
call on the friends of God to intercede for them. The wali, or Muslim saint, is simultaneously close to God (walaya) and a patron for his clients (wilaya) or for those Muslims who follow his teachings. These two frameworks allow Islamic saints to fulfill their two chief roles: to intercede with God on behalf of those particular people who appeal to them and to facilitate the path of devotees in reaching union with God on Judgment Day. The tombs of Muslim saints—or during their lifetimes, their residences—are objects of pilgrimage by those who wish to obtain divine assistance and baraka. Shaykh Nazim’s residence is a good modern example.

By contrast, determining exactly who is a saint within the Islamic tradition is a more complicated and informal process. Muslim saints become saints through a process of community or group acclamation. While there is a loosely defined script for becoming a saint, there is not a single agreed-upon set of standards for identifying sainthood or special holy status. There is neither a process of canonization nor a constituted body to initiate it as in Catholicism. Still, it is believed that anyone whom God has given protection against error and empowered to uphold the unity and sanctity of His religion is a saint. Anyone, in turn, who has achieved saintly status merits great respect and is thought to fill a role for their age analogous to that played by the prophet Muhammad in the earliest Muslim community. Within this framework, one’s ability to build a clientele usually validates one’s religious mission. In effect, worldly success is proof that God is on your side.

Equally important, many Sufi shaykhs, such as Shaykh Khalid or even Shaykh Nazim, are widely acclaimed as saints while still living and fulfill important social, political, and community functions. Saintly authority is often retained through many generations. And political, tribal, and social structures are reinforced by allegiances to particular saints and tariqas. While the authority of “holiness” or proximity to God is often transferred through male lineages within families, there are also instances in which daughters or wives assume saintly status. An example of this process is Nana Asma’u (1793–1864), the daughter of the prominent West African Muslim figure Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817). During her lifetime, she was a formidable scholar, poet, teacher, warrior, and advocate for her father’s ideas. She remains a role model for West African Muslim women in the twenty-first century.

---

22 Ibid., pp. xix–xx.
23 For more on Nana Asma’u, see Beverly B. Mack and Jean Boyd, One Woman’s Jihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).
For decades, many of these Western scholars have extensively discussed saintly traditions among Muslims. According to these scholars, such phenomena were “rural” or “folk” Islam, strikingly different from the scriptural Islam of Muslim cities, and “were far and away the single most important cause of the decay of Islamic civilization.”

It was widely believed among these scholars that Sufism and sainthood were destined to retreat to the backward, rural, and uneducated fringes of secular and rapidly modernizing Muslim societies. Clifford Geertz notes in *The Religion of Java* that the Qadiriyya, the Naqshbandiyya, and the other Sufi orders had “declined in numbers” during the twentieth century and now “took the form of brotherhoods of aged men” who spent their days counting beads. J. S. Trimingham notes that both Sufi orders and otherworldly and spiritual references had virtually disappeared in many Arab and Muslim societies by the 1970s. He attributes this decline in spiritual practices to secularization, “changes in the outlook and in the social order,” and Muslims’ failure to “adapt their traditional interpretation of Islam” to life in the modern world.

Yet, three decades after Trimingham wrote those words, Sufis and Muslim saints continue to appeal to a wide spectrum of Muslims in both urban and rural settings. Here it is important to remember that the person who asked me if Shaykh Nazim had touched my backpack was a computer programmer—among the most modern of professions—and was from Damascus, a cosmopolitan city and the capital of one of the most secular nations in the Middle East. Nor was he the only person in the room who worked in a recognizably modern profession: one also found record producers, engineers, doctors, schoolteachers, and businessmen. These individuals are not the types of people whom Trimingham or other Western scholars believed associate with *turuq*, nor are they likely to be duped by some “trickery” of Shaykh Nazim. Again, remember that Nazim switched from speaking Arabic with me to speaking English when he realized that it was the only language that all of the people present could understand. It is difficult to imagine that uneducated, rural people would have the proficiency in English to understand Nazim’s discussion with me on the life and teachings of Shaykh Khalid.

---

27 Ibid., pp. 257–258.
Shaykh Khalid and Social Movement Theory

To explain the appeal of Shaykh Nazim to cosmopolitan and educated Sunni Muslims, it is best to start with the ideas and legacy of the man on whom Shaykh Nazim has modeled his own career: Shaykh Khalid. Born in 1776 in a small village in the Ottoman-Iranian frontier district of Shahrazur in what is today northeastern Iraq, Shaykh Khalid began his career in 1810, when he is said to have journeyed to India and joined the Naqshbandiyya tariqa. A year later, Shaykh Khalid returned to Kurdistan. There he founded a suborder of the Naqshbandiyya that bore his name: the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya. He dispatched hundreds of deputies to various regions in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and South and Central Asia. But differences with religious and political leaders and international tensions prevented him from settling anywhere permanently until he came to Damascus in 1823. He died there just four years later, a victim of bubonic plague.

By the time of his death, Shaykh Khalid held a position analogous to that of a Catholic bishop in an important city. His cultural and religious authority was sufficiently pervasive to merit the respect of government officials and politicians. The Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya had also grown into a socioreligious network with thousands of Sunni Muslim adherents in Anatolia, the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Kurdistan. All these adherents were troubled about the state of the societies in which they lived and saw Shaykh Khalid as the key to a brighter future. The tariqa also brought together wealthy merchants, senior religious figures, and important politicians into a framework akin to the Christian Coalition or Focus on the Family in the United States today. Following Khalid’s death, the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya expanded across the globe, gained great influence, and played an important role in Muslim sociopolitical movements in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Southeast Asia. Today, Shaykh Khalid remains an important figure in countries as diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Syria, Indonesia, and Germany.

Social movement theory provides the flexibility to evaluate a figure like Khalid, who modified key aspects of his Way and emphasized different aspects of his identity and views to various audiences. This mode of analysis was initially a reflection of the desire by scholars to explain the turbulence and sociopolitical movements of the 1960s. To understand such phenomena, social movement theory eschews ideology and emphasizes the structures of political opportunities and constraints confronting movements, along with informal and formal modes of
organization available to participants and the collective processes used by intellectuals for interpretation, attribution, and social construction. Critical to social movement theory are the principles that social movements neither act irrationally nor operate in a vacuum; their actions and objectives reflect the sociocultural contexts out of which they emerge. In the eyes of a social movement theorist, it matters less what the specific ideas and agendas of social movements are than how and where people implement those ideas.

Of the various tools of social movement theory, the framing process is the most important. Broadly speaking, framing can be thought of as a process by which movements analyze problems (the “diagnosis” frame), stipulate solutions (the “prognosis” frame), and convince followers that solutions are attainable (the “motivational” frame). Movements can utilize multiple frames simultaneously to appeal to different audiences. Framing also reveals how movements weave symbols, events, issues, and beliefs into coherent messages. Doug McAdam’s work provides us with an excellent recent example of this process—the various frames which Martin Luther King Jr. used to promote the Civil Rights movement:

In accounting for King’s success . . . much of the credit must go to the substantive content of his thought. Quite simply, no black leader had ever sounded like King before. In his unique blending of familiar Christian themes, conventional democratic theory, and the philosophy of nonviolence, King brought an unusually compelling, yet accessible, framework to the struggle . . . While singling out this or that theme in King’s thought, it should be noted that the very variety of themes granted those in the media (and the general public) multiple points of ideological contact with the movement. So, secular liberals might be unmoved by King’s reading of Christian theology, but resonate with the application of democratic theory. And so on. In short, the sheer variety of themes invoked by King combined with their substantive resonance to give his thought (and the movement he came for many to symbolize) an . . . appeal unmatched by many other movement figures.28

Here it is important to note that King, like Shaykh Khalid before him, tied together a host of existing ideas and cultural symbols into a frame

---

for a movement without precedent. He diagnosed the problem of racial discrimination in America through democratic theory and Christian theology. He then offered a solution to the problem through the philosophy of nonviolence. These various frames, in turn, appealed to multiple American audiences simultaneously and convinced them of the efficacy and righteousness of his cause.

When thinking about the framing process, it is useful to bear in mind Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “traditional” intellectuals, who see themselves as autonomous, as opposed to “organic” intellectuals, who view themselves as part of existing elites. Organic intellectuals such as Martin Luther King Jr. are active participants in practical life: they are constructors, organizers, “permanent persuaders,” and not just simple orators. Framing is usually the product of conceptual articulations by “organic intellectuals.”

In the case of Shaykh Khalid, framing involves asking two separate questions. First, how did Khalid construct his view of the world (the diagnosis frame), propose solutions to sociopolitical challenges (the prognosis frame), and instill faith in his followers as to the correctness and power of his solutions (the motivational frame)? Second, how did he and his order win the allegiance of a wide variety of Muslims of all classes in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century and subsequently Muslims from different linguistic, cultural, and geographic zones? Together, these questions provide us with a composite picture of how and where Shaykh Khalid shaped his Way over time, assigned meaning to his Way, and interacted with different constituencies and individuals.

The composite picture allows us to see that the achievements of Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya reflect a nexus of four factors. The first is changing sociopolitical conditions in the Ottoman Empire during Khalid’s lifetime, and later, in the Muslim world as a whole in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These conditions transformed mass culture and led to the rise of Sufi brotherhoods as a key vehicle of religious expression and responses to globalization. According to John Voll, technological change since the eighteenth century radically altered both the outlook and lifestyle of ordinary people by greatly expanding their ability “to communicate and par-

---

ticipate in the activities beyond their immediate localities. As these changes unfolded, Muslims—like people of other religious faiths and traditions—sought methods, institutions, and intellectual frameworks that could mediate between their ancient local identities and the economic, social, and political norms of the new globalizing human community. Because Sufi orders and saints had been a regular aspect of everyday life in Muslim communities for centuries, they were a natural framework for Muslims who wished to remain true to their faith in the new sociocultural contexts. Ironically, the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya tariqa was especially well equipped to meet the needs of Muslims in this new milieu because of Shaykh Khalid’s doctrines that little really changed in the world and that Muslims’ belief in otherworldly powers, including sainthood, remained the only true path to salvation.

The second factor is the role of women, who were instrumental in the rapid dissemination of the tariqa and retain considerable influence today. Though women are almost completely absent from scholarship on Shaykh Khalid’s life, his wife Khadija and other women were teachers, administrators, financial contributors, and political leaders in the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya. One of Khalid’s daughters, Fatima, was a prominent teacher of the order in Damascus in the nineteenth century, while the largest contributor to Khalid’s properties in Baghdad was a woman. Even more impressive is the case of Khalid’s wife. Khadija oversaw Khalid’s properties and pious endowment in Syria for more than six decades after his death and forged close ties with the elites of the Ottoman Empire, including members of the royal family. Until her death at the age of 111 in 1888, Khadija wielded significant

---


31 Ibid., pp. 8–10.

32 Khadija was one of Shaykh Khalid’s three wives known to have been alive in 1828. For more on this issue, see Makama Shar’iyya li-Dimashq, 312:165, 444, case dated 14 Dhu’l-Qa’dah 1243 (28 May 1828) and Foley, “Shaykh Khalid,” pp. 198–200.

33 Fatima was well schooled in the Islamic sciences and spoke four languages: Arabic, Farsi, Turkish, and Kurdish. For more on her life, see Mut’i’ al-Hafi z and Nizar Abaza, Ulama Dimashq wa-a’yanuha fi al-qarn al-thalith ‘ashar al-hijri (Bayrut: Dar al-Fikr al-Mu’asir; Dimashq: Dar al-Fikr, 1991), 2:681–682.

political influence in Istanbul and Damascus and among adherents to the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya tariqa. \(^{35}\)

The prominence of these women should come as no surprise since there is nothing intrinsic to Shaykh Khalid’s teachings or the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya’s devotional practices that precludes women from participating in the social movement or in political life generally. Just as there is a silsila, or formal chain of spiritual descent, from Shaykh Khalid to his contemporary male disciples, there is an active silsila of female shaykhs that dates back to his lifetime. Today, hundreds of girls and young women are trained annually in the tariqa in Damascus alone and develop their own followings.\(^{36}\)

The third aspect of Shaykh Khalid’s success was his ability to tailor aspects of his identity and his teachings to allow him—like Martin Luther King Jr.—to offer the public multiple points, or “frames,” of contact with the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya tariqa. While some Muslims saw Khalid’s affiliation with the Naqshbandiyya tariqa and emphasis on silent over vocal dhikr as demonstrating the righteousness and power of his ideas, his scholarship and his discussions of Islamic law and philosophy resonated with still more. Other Muslims responded to appeals framed around his ethnicity and tribal affiliation. Though he readily acknowledged his Kurdish identity, Khalid also stressed aspects of his identity that linked him to Arabs, Turks, and Shia Iranians.\(^{37}\) He stressed his ties to Baghdad (an “Arab” city),\(^{38}\) wrote extensive treatises in Farsi and Arabic, and claimed to be a Sayyid, or descendant of the

---

\(^{35}\) Egyptian and Ottoman documents indicate that Khadija assumed close control over Khalid’s properties in Syria after his death and that she built close ties with the Egyptian government during the Egyptian occupation of Syria in the 1830s and won a state pension. In the years after the restoration of Ottoman sovereignty in Syria in 1840, Khadija also forged ties with Ottoman officials, including senior female members of the Ottoman royal family, such as the mother of Ottoman sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–1876). Khadija won exemptions for Khalid’s son and grandson from military service, state salaries for members of Khalid’s family, and tax exemptions for the family’s properties. She also won generous state funds for the upkeep of Shaykh Khalid’s tomb—appealing directly to highest levels in the Ottoman government. When Khadija died in 1888, Sultan Abdülhamit II (r. 1876–1909) requested that a leading Istanbul intellectual compose a special note eulogizing his decision to uphold her request to rebuild Khalid’s tomb in Damascus, Syria. For more on Khadija, see Foley, “Shaykh Khalid,” pp. 83–84, 188, 201–202.


\(^{37}\) For more on these issues, see Foley, “Shaykh Khalid,” pp. 100–101, 251–315.

\(^{38}\) Shaykh Khalid affectionately referred to Baghdad by its ancient epithet, medinat al-Salam (the city of peace), and frequently expressed his desire to return there when he was away from the city.
The fourth and final aspect of Shaykh Khalid’s success was his willingness to employ flexible and timeless frames to explain the problems that Muslims faced, how they could address their problems, and why his program of reform would succeed. In his diagnostic frame, Khalid gave a clear explanation for who was responsible for the crises afflicting Islamic societies of his day: Muslims had fallen into the clutches of *dunya* by needlessly limiting their perceptions to what was easiest for them to see and overlooking the clear gulf between appearance and reality, earth and heaven. Khalid argued that Muslims had forgotten that very little changed in human history, and the present moment is nothing but an illusion generated by Satan and *dunya*. At the same time, Khalid warned his followers that they should not become ascetics or withdraw from the world. It was not enough to live life virtuously in private; one had to engage the world directly.

If Muslims were the cause of the world’s problems, then they had the power to reverse these problems and revitalize their societies. This notion was at the heart of Khalid’s prognostic frame and was akin to answering the classic Leninesque question, “What is to be done?” In this context, Shaykh Khalid again remained flexible. While he told his followers in Baghdad to limit the order to just thirty members and warned of the stark dangers of associating with politicians, he supported the work of his followers in Amadia and in Istanbul to increase the size of the order and forge very close ties with senior government officials. In a letter to a follower in Kurdistan, Sayyid Ma‘ruf al-Barzinji, Shaykh Khalid denied he had the right to expel anyone from

---

39 Sayyids in the first third of the nineteenth century were treated with great reverence and had special legal and tax privileges. For more on these privileges, see Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985), pp. 124–131.

40 For more on this issue, see Sahib, *Bughyat al-wajid*, pp. 118–119, 144, 256–257, 268.

41 Even Shaykh Khalid was not above temptation, as he notes in his *Diwan*: “Oh Khalid, this mortal life has no value; Rebuff its illusions and prepare for seriousness and work.” In another poem, he admits “how brave I was to commit sins” and to “accompany” Satan. Khalid, *Diwan*, poem 25, p. 2.

42 For example, Shaykh Khalid instructed Mustafa Efendi that “God said not to contribute to another world; you have to care about this one.” Khalid, *Maktubat Khalid Baghdadi*, folio 50a.

43 Ibid., folios 4b and 32b. Amadia is in the northern region of Iraq in the Dahuk Governorate. Dahuk is part of the Kurdish autonomous zone in Iraq.
the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya.⁴⁴ By contrast, after a leading disciple in the tariqa, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Susi, challenged Shaykh Khalid’s authority, he expelled al-Susi and threatened damnation to anyone who associated with him.⁴⁵

Perhaps most strikingly, Khalid argued that one should not judge others as “Muslims or non-Muslims” and spoke highly of Christians, Jews, Shias, and their seminal religious texts.⁴⁶ He also allowed Abbas Mirza (1788–1833), the son of the Shah of Iran and the governor of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, to affiliate with the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya.⁴⁷ On the other hand, he ordered his Istanbul followers to modify the wording of the tariqa’s dhikr to call for the annihilation of Jews, Christians, and Iranian Shias.⁴⁸ While Khalid had female disciples in Iraq and in Syria, he forbade his disciples in Istanbul to marry Turkish women or to allow young women to enter the tariqa’s Istanbul lodge; the point of this was to prevent the followers from forming independent alliances with Turkish elites.⁴⁹ In his own eyes, Shaykh Khalid’s actions—however inconsistent they may have appeared to others—were consistent because they were part of his program of performing God’s work, a work which transcended historical particulars and required different strategies in different contexts.

No matter how flexible Shaykh Khalid’s program was, it would have been of little use to him or to his followers if he failed to convince enough Muslims that it was viable and would succeed. This was Khalid’s motivational frame. It combined Quranic teachings and an assertion of his otherworldly powers. Shaykh Khalid, citing the Quran, argued that God permits individuals to choose either to accept or reject his teachings. Muslims could help realize a world that conformed to their ideals if they chose to accept his path, which, for Khalid, was synonymous with the teachings of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya.⁵⁰

Critical to this process was the acceptance of Shaykh Khalid’s status as a powerful Muslim saint who alone had the power to link adherents directly to God. All adherents in the tariqa had the power to link with Khalid through a spiritual exercise called rabita, or “connection,” in which a disciple would “link” with a Sufi master. Khalid

---

⁴⁴ Sahib, Bughyat al-wajid, pp. 120–121.
⁴⁶ Sahib, Bughyat al-wajid, pp. 67–68, 120–121.
⁴⁷ Khalid, Maktubat Khalid Baghdadi, folio 220b.
⁴⁸ Ibid., folios 19b, 3a.
⁴⁹ Sahib, Bughyat al-wajid, p. 121.
promised that *rabita* could permit him to protect individuals from harm and deliver them to salvation on Judgment Day.\(^{51}\) He also taught that *rabita* extended to adherents whom he had never personally met and would remain in effect indefinitely. Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya adherents could rest assured that Shaykh Khalid could protect and help them at all times and places—even after his death.\(^{52}\)

Perhaps the most powerful aspect of Shaykh Khalid’s program of reform was the seemingly timeless quality of his various frames; they could be applied to many Muslim societies in multiple time periods. For Muslims, Shaykh Khalid provided a plausible and reassuring explanation for otherwise incomprehensible events, and the explanation was consistent with teachings that Muslims had upheld for centuries. He was simply reminding them of aspects of their faith that they had momentarily forgotten. The nature and order of the world had not been altered—despite the outward appearances that non-Muslims were gaining ever-greater power.

**The Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya after Khalid’s Death**

In the decades following Shaykh Khalid’s death, as the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya spread throughout the Muslim world, more Muslim peoples from North Africa to Bosnia to the Indonesian archipelago looked on Khalid as one of their own. But the rapid spread of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya *tariqa* was not accompanied by the rapid dissemination of Shaykh Khalid’s Way. In the years immediately after his death, Shaykh Khalid’s followers often modified many of the most basic tenants of his Way—even going so far as adopting vocal *dhikr* and suggesting that adherents “link” in *rabita* with a living shaykh instead of Shaykh Khalid. By the time the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya had traveled to Indonesia, it had adopted devotional practices that would have been unrecognizable to an adherent of the *tariqa* in Shaykh Khalid’s day.

Still, Khalid’s followers retained his focus on *dunya* and the image of Khalid as a saint in order to legitimize their own activities. Political and religious figures in various parts of the Islamic world use familial, ethnic, or devotional ties with him to legitimize their own power and authority. Shaykh Nazim proclaims that he is the renewer of God and Islam in the current “age of material progress and technology” in the


\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 310–318.
same way that Khalid was the renewer of Islamic law and Sufi brotherhoods in the Middle East. Thousands of visitors of different nationalities, classes, and ages pay their respects to Khalid’s tomb in Damascus every year, hoping to benefit from his blessings. Two centuries after his death, Khalid’s status as a religious figure is unquestioned. His teachings have achieved their principal goal: solidifying his status as a wali.

If Khalid had not achieved this goal, it is unlikely that the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya would have spread so rapidly or would have become a vehicle for Muslims in all regions to resist perceived injustices and corruption, to reform and reinvigorate their societies, or battle for the soul of Islam. It was not what Shaykh Khalid said or wrote that is ultimately significant: it was what he was—or what people perceived him to be—that made him a figure to be remembered. During Khalid’s lifetime, his doctrinal points were strengthened by his status as saint, but, after his death, the doctrinal points vanished into a powerful myth which he himself had begun to create. Finally, legend took hold and offered the image of a man who was more than a man. Shaykh Khalid renewed the faith by creating the figure of a man who was the faith in current garb. As a result, he became a kind of Muslim Che Guevara, an immensely popular figure whose specific ideas are little known but whose image is everywhere.

As the adherents to the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya brought the tariqa to wider audiences and modified its doctrines, they assumed a role that Sufi brotherhoods have long held within the sociocultural structure of the world Muslim community. According to John Voll, the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya and other Sufi orders functioned as bridges within an Islamic world-system “linking men and women through informal networks of scholars and saints,” networks that were themselves “built upon shared understandings of how to see the world and structure one’s relationship to it.” Perhaps the most critical part of this process is the creation of a mediator between established and new parts of the Muslim community—be they newly Islamized nations or Muslim immigrants to Western Europe and other predominantly non-Muslim regions of the world.

In the case of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, one could see this mediating role clearly through the number of European and American converts present at the dhikr I attended in Damascus. Similarly, the Muridiyya, a Senegalese Sufi order, mediates between global and

\[53\] For more on this issue, see http://sultanulawliya.blogspot.com/2005/10/his-travels.html and http://www.naqshbandi.org/chain/40.htm.

distinctive, local identities. The order maintains a worldwide network of followers in communities as far away from West Africa as North America and Western Europe. In fact, the Senegalese singer Youssou N'Dour notes in “Touba Daru Salaam” that the Muridiyya has so many disciples in France that “they cannot be counted.”

Finding a New Grammar of Life

The presence of Senegalese Sufi brotherhoods in France suggests that an explanation of the vitality of Islamic sainthood must touch on the framework for religious experience and social movements outside specifically Muslim states. Since the mid eighteenth century, Western scholars have argued that religious experience would be shaped by a process of socioeconomic, cultural, and political transformation—or modernization—in which science and rationality would supplant religion and faith in human affairs. Human societies over time would evolve into nation-states based on a belief in progress, order, and atheism. Social movements in modern societies would function within modern institutions—such as parties—and focus on secular issues: distribution of material goods, state power, and general socioeconomic issues. Voltaire, Thomas Jefferson, Auguste Comte, Max Weber, and Sigmund Freud all predicted that belief in supernatural powers was doomed to die out eventually.

During the last thirty years, however, the rise of religious political organizations, feminism, and environmentalism in the West has compelled scholars to radically alter their theoretical constructs. Strikingly, Joseph Tamney found in 1979 and 1980 that Muslims in Java, Indonesia, who had attended college were far more outwardly pious than those with little education or exposure to modernity. Rodney Stark notes in “Secularization, R.I.P.” that Tamney’s findings should come as no surprise since church attendance was substantially higher.

---

55 There are also a variety of Pakistani Muslim orders in British cities that have a devoted network of followers as far away as Pakistan. For more on this issue, see Pnina Werbner, “Pakistani Migration and Diaspora Religious Politics in a Global Age,” in Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, ed. Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, and Ian Skoggard, pp. 479, 484 (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2005).


in many Western societies during the twentieth century than it had been centuries earlier during the Middle Ages (and before the onset of modernization). Stark concludes by calling for “an end to the social scientific faith in the theory of secularization,” labeling it the product of “wishful thinking” and as “useless as a hotel elevator that only goes down.” Though it was not clear what the defining construct of the new era and new social movements was, scholars agreed that it was no longer “modern,” adopting the more amorphous term “postmodern” to describe a host of movements and phenomena.

In his landmark article “New Social Movements,” Jürgen Habermas provided a theoretical framework to understand postmodern social movements, including religious movements. According to Habermas, a “silent revolution” had occurred in West Germany, the United States, and other societies since the 1950s. During this revolution, the old politics of entrepreneurs, workers, and professional middle class gave way to a “new politics” of a new middle class, younger people, and individuals with higher levels of formal education. The central issue of the new politics is “how to defend and reinstate endangered lifestyles” or “how to put reformed lifestyles into practice.” Habermas further observes that new social conflicts are no longer “sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of forms of life.” By using the term “grammar,” Habermas is not attempting to link the rules governing the use of language with social movements. His definition of grammar is synonymous with what is known in American political discourse today as “values.” For him, “grammar” is the principles by which one’s life is lived.

Among the most important of these principles is postmaterialism. Advocates of postmaterialism emphasize “quality of life” over modernist concerns—those dealing with economic or material circumstances: “It is not that the postmaterialists reject the fruits of prosperity,” Ronald Inglehart notes, “but simply that their value priorities are less strongly dominated by the imperatives that were central” to modern society.

---

59 Ibid., p. 269.
60 Jürgen Habermas, “New Social Movements,” Telos 49 (Fall 1981): 33.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
Inglehart goes on to argue that postmaterialism represents an important shift in the values of the West and is transforming “basic norms governing politics, work, religion, family, and sexual behavior.” Fundamentally, this system of thought compels individuals to liberate themselves from materialist society by transcending and controlling wealth rather than rejecting it.

Over the past twenty-five years, scholars have sought to use these insights to understand the rise of militant groups in the Muslim world. While these comparisons have yielded significant insights, they nevertheless overemphasize the influence wielded by a few thousand militants over a world Muslim population of nearly a billion people. They also overlook the fact that Osama bin Laden has adopted a term that Shaykh Khalid deployed nearly two hundred years earlier to describe the predicament of the Muslim world: *dunya* (materiality). The term appears in the al-Qaeda–produced video that was widely distributed in the Middle East shortly before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Throughout the tape, bin Laden lists the injustices committed against Muslims in a host of nations and characterizes the leaders of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim nations as Western puppets. Repeatedly, graphic images of sickly children, demolished homes, warfare, and soldiers beating elderly women are juxtaposed with calls to Muslim honor. Yet when bin Laden asks how such injustices and affronts to Muslim honor occurred, he does not blame the West, Israel, or Muslim governments. Instead, he blames Sunni Muslims for placing their love of *dunya* over their love of *din* (religion).

The similarity between the ideas of postmateriality and those of Khalid and other Muslim figures is borne out by sociocultural trends in the Western world. The rise of postmateriality in Europe and the United States in the 1960s was simultaneous with the increased interest in Eastern philosophies and Sufism, especially in the poetry of Jalaluddin Rumi, a thirteenth-century Islamic saint and Sufi shaykh. For many years, Rumi has been one of the best-selling poets in the United States. Furthermore, the American poet Allen Ginsberg (1926–1997) specifically referred to “Mohammedan angels” in his immensely influ-

---


ential poem “Howl.”67 This trend is so developed in the West that Pope Benedict XVI recently caustically observed that European culture “had departed from the scene” and that the time had “arrived to affirm the value systems of other worlds, such as pre-Columbian America, Islam, or Asian mysticism.”68

One also sees a comparable nexus of postmaterialism and Sufism among educated urban Indonesians. In “Sufism and the Indonesian Revival,” Julia Day Howell notes that many educated Indonesians, including the nation’s most powerful men and women, have sought in recent decades to “infuse” their outward expressions of Islam with an inner meaning drawn from Sufism.69 Often this process calls for the rejection of material values—that is, the “temptations” of the city—in favor of piety.70 Among the Indonesians most successful at achieving this balance is Kadirun Yahya, a Naqshbandi shaykh and university professor whose writings seek to reconcile mysticism with physics, chemistry, and other Western scientific disciplines.71

The ability of the Naqshbandiyya and other Sufi brotherhoods to make life more meaningful and to find a better balance with materialism was best summed up by a fifty-year-old German record producer I met while visiting Shaykh Nazim. The German told me that his career had brought him everything he could have ever wanted—money, fame, creative freedom, and beautiful women. But he felt that something was missing. One day he saw a sign for meetings of the Naqshbandiyya tariqa, several of which he attended. Still uncertain whether the tariqa and Islam were the solution to his existential crisis, he asked to speak to Shaykh Nazim personally. A short time later, Nazim called him and began by asking which production methods of compact discs were the most profitable. At that moment, the German told me, he realized that

67 Ginsberg notes in the poem that the “best minds of his generation” had “bared their brains to Heaven under the El and saw Mohammedan angels staggering on tenement roofs illuminated.” For more on this poem, see Allen Ginsberg, Howl: Original Draft Facsimile, Transcript & Variant Versions, ed. Barry Miles (New York: Harper Perennial, 1995), p. 3. The reference is to line 5 of the poem.
70 Mark Woodward saw evidence of this process in the 1980s. In Islam in Java, he discusses a pesantren (Islamic theological school) in Indonesia associated with the Qadiriyya-Naqshbandiyya order that administers a large primary school, sponsors credit associations and loans money to farmers, and runs thirteen drug rehabilitation centers that use dhikr for drug treatment. One of the centers is located in Malaysia. Mark Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989), pp. 138–139.
Nazim was the man destined to resolve his spiritual crisis: Nazim was both a man of “great” spirituality and grounded in the contemporary world. “Now here was a man,” the German proclaimed, “who I could do business with.”

**Conclusion**

Shaykh Nazim’s ability to conduct business and to fill the spiritual needs of people as disparate and as modern as an Arab Syrian computer programmer and a German record producer is indicative of the relevance of Islamic sainthood and Sufism in particular to the contemporary world. By building on established traditions, sociocultural structures, and existing associational networks, Sufi brotherhoods have often “emerged as more effective modern associations” than labor unions, parties, and other organizations “structured in a more explicitly modern manner.”

Sufi brotherhoods have also been flexible enough in structure, administrations, and their teachings to operate effectively in an astonishing number of cultural, linguistic, and geographic zones. This is especially true for the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya tariqa. Its network extends throughout much of Europe, North America, and the Middle East as well as in East and Southeast Asia.

There is little sign that Sufi brotherhoods and Islamic sainthood as institutions are disappearing or that they have been replaced by modern societies and institutions. In fact, the opposite has occurred: not only have Sufism and Islamic sainthood outlived “modernity,” they have also emerged in an even stronger position than they were before the emergence of the modern age—establishing a presence even in regions of the world that were not known previously as Islamic zones. While Sufi brotherhoods and Islamic saints rarely make headlines, one cannot dismiss their influence in the present or the foreseeable future. They have a devoted and active membership base that far exceeds that of al-Qaeda or other similar organizations. Any discussion of the battle for the “soul of Islam” must take into account Sufis and Islamic saints and their views of the world.

The Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya experience in particular provides a good case study of this process. By building on Shaykh Khalid’s image as a Muslim saint and his strident emphasis on the avoidance of *dunya*, Shaykh Nazim and other adherents to the order have been able to

---

construct a framework that corresponds to the Islamic tradition but accounts for technologies, sociocultural modes of behavior, and institutions unimaginable during Khalid’s lifetime: the Internet, videos, CDs, DVDs, cell phones, the spread of Islam into Western Europe and North America, and the emergence of English as the lingua franca of the global community.

Moreover, Nazim and his followers have deftly taken advantage of changes in Western cultural values, the resurgence of religion, and the need for spiritual fulfillment, along with the rise of postmaterialism and other modes of thought critical of the modern outlook. Modernity and a technologically based society were able to offer much to their adherents. What they were not able to offer was an all-embracing myth that dictated behavior, explained the universe in a vivid image, and assigned each person a place in that universe.

This discussion of the institution of Islamic sainthood, the ideas of Shaykh Khalid, and the spread of the Naqshbandiya-Khalidiyya tariqa permits us to make three observations about the development of Islamic and Western societies, their religious traditions, and the sociology of religion generally. First, Muslim societies never made the expected transformation during the twentieth century into modern, secular societies modeled on those in Europe and North America. Instead, Muslims, along with Buddhists and those associated with other non-European religious traditions, provided avenues for Europeans and Americans (and even some “modern” Muslims) to reengage material culture and to reembrace religion. In particular, Europeans and Americans looked to the non-European traditions as vehicles for reclaiming the symbolic, metaphorical, and mystical.

Second, Shaykh Khalid’s espousal of a kind of postmodern system of beliefs during the first third of the nineteenth century—decades before scholars coined the term “postmodern”—and the similarities between his movement and that of American Christian movements raise questions about the methods and intellectual framework we use to identify and to analyze postmodern ideas and social movements in world history.

Third, Shaykh Khalid and his tariqa suggest that one can unify a very large network of individuals around the presence or the memory of a charismatic individual—even if, as in Christianity, there is little agreement on a unifying ideology or set of ideas. While this insight is most applicable to Muslim movements, it could provide insights into the history and development of social movements based in other religious traditions, especially those that incorporate sainthood.

Finally, it remains an open question whether the longing for reli-
Religion is hardwired or culturally induced in humans. But it is a powerful force in consciousness. It is hard at times for Muslims, Christians, and members of other faiths to conceive of a religion that does not force us to choose between the claims of this world and the claims of heaven. Reconciling these claims, however, was crucial to Shaykh Khalid. He stressed that he offered a path by which individuals could reform their lives, seek salvation, end corruption, and engage the world without succumbing to the temptations of \textit{dunya}. A key aspect of this stance was his assumption of the mantle of a Muslim saint who could protect his followers from harm and deliver them salvation on Judgment Day. Equally important, he stressed that little really changed in the world, and that the present moment—no matter how disastrous or incomprehensible it appeared to be—is an illusion. Anything suggesting otherwise was the work of Satan or \textit{dunya}. Yet he himself at times suggested otherwise. In a poem in his \textit{Diwan}, Khalid allows not only for heaven but for heaven on earth:

\begin{quote}
There are four heavens on this earth:
In Samarqand, there is the Sughd (Soghdia Valley); in Basra there is the Ubilla Canal; in Persia there is the Shi‘b Bawwân (Bawwân gully) in Shiraz; and in Syria there is the al-Ghuta Oasis.\footnote{Khalid, \textit{Diwan}, poem 56, p. 5. Shaykh Khalid’s list of four heavens is identical to a group of four heavens or “earthly paradises” that have been discussed by many Muslim geographers over the centuries. For more on this subject, see Guy Le Strange, \textit{The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate}, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 44–47, 264–267, and 460–461; Tabarai, \textit{The History of al-Tabari: The Marwanid Restoration}, trans. Everett K. Rowson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 150 n. 554 and 158 n. 575; and Tha‘alibi, \textit{The Lata‘if al-ma‘arif of Tha‘alibi (The Book of Curious and Entertaining Information)}, trans. C. E. Bosworth (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), pp. 118–119.}
\end{quote}

After Shaykh Khalid’s death, the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya \textit{tariqa} has maintained his delicate balance between the claims of heaven and earth, and as such it holds out hope even in the midst of the confusions and violence of the present world.

\footnote{For a recent discussion of this ongoing debate, see Richard Dawkins, \textit{The God Delusion} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), pp. 163–207.}

\footnote{For a recent discussion of this ongoing debate, see Richard Dawkins, \textit{The God Delusion} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), pp. 163–207.}