Shifting Borders: America and the Middle East /North Africa

Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference
Sponsored by The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud Center for American Studies and Research at the American University of Beirut

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When the Qur’an was America’s Weapon for Freedom in the Middle East: Muhammad Siblini and the Defeat of the Axis in North Africa

Sean Foley
Middle Tennessee State University

In August 1963, a major political scandal erupted in Western Europe when the French police arrested Georges Pâques and accused him of providing highly sensitive military information to the Soviet Union. Pâques was an unlikely figure to spy for Moscow. He was an associate of the French Right and French President Charles de Gaulle, had been a trusted senior civil servant in a variety of ministries in France for nineteen years, and was then the deputy press secretary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The organization’s officials had entrusted him with NATO’s highest security clearance. His government positions took up 43 lines in France’s Who’s Who. Many in France’s elite had been his colleagues in university; some had known him since childhood. Senior members of the country’s Right and its Left publicly supported him at his trial.¹

For his part, Pâques freely admitted that he had committed treason and explained that he had come to view Americans as enemies of both world peace and of France after witnessing the success of American public diplomacy in North Africa during World War II. He was particularly angry with the actions in North Africa in 1943 of an American army officer of Lebanese ancestry named Muhammad Siblini.² Pâques had served in French army intelligence in Algeria in World War II, and he blamed Siblini for turning Algerians against French rule and for setting the stage for the war of independence in the 1950s. Nor was Pâques alone in viewing Siblini and U.S. public diplomacy as dangerous during World War II: Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister for propaganda, loathed Siblini and believed that his radio broadcasts in Arabic turned Arabs against the Axis in World War II. This paper seeks to explain
how Siblini facilitated U.S. objectives in the Arab world during World War II and earned the ire of Pâques, Goebbels, and others. Through his command of Arabic and piety, Siblini served as a key intermediary for U.S. officials and Muslims as a diplomat and as a radio broadcaster. He demonstrated enormous skill while reciting the Qur’an, and he often read passages on the radio that reflected American values and war aims. Equally important, U.S. officials cited Siblini’s success to counteract anti-American German and Italian propaganda in the Middle East and to demonstrate that the United States was a haven for all peoples and faiths. Though largely forgotten after the war, Siblini and the public diplomacy he promoted are significant today in light of the ongoing debate about Muslims and their faith’s role in U.S. public life. Ultimately, Siblini’s story demonstrates the contributions of Arabs and Muslims to U.S. diplomacy – even before Washington became a pivotal actor in the politics of the Middle East after 1945.

Muhammad Siblini was born in Beirut, Lebanon in 1910 to a then-prominent Sunni Muslim merchant family that claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad. The family sold furs and skins from Iran, Iraq, and other parts of the Middle East. Siblini received an education in classical Arabic (Fusha), Islam, and the Qur’an. He eventually became a skilled reader of the Qur’an. He also received a modern education in both French and English. He traveled to Baghdad to buy furs for his family’s business and, at age 16, he went on Hajj. In the 1930s, he moved to New York City, where he started a fur-importing business and became a U.S. citizen.3

When the United States entered World War II in 1941, Siblini was drafted and designated to start an officer training program. But he was transferred in 1942 to aid an operation where his skills and his background would be invaluable: Operation Torch, in which Allied forces, under the command of General Patton, aimed to liberate French North Africa from Axis control. Remarkably, Siblini was one of a handful of Arabic-speaking soldiers and officers assigned to the operation and the only native speaker to have received a formal education in classical Arabic and Islam.4 A gifted public speaker, Siblini gave frequent seminars on the Arab world and on Islam to enlisted soldiers and to senior staff officers on his ship during the long trip from North America to Africa.5

While traveling to North Africa, he met and befriended a U.S. intelligence officer also assigned to Operation Torch, Archibald Roosevelt Jr., whose father was a decorated colonel in the U.S. Army and whose grandfather was U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. The younger Roosevelt was a gifted linguist and spoke twenty languages, including Arabic. He had graduated from Harvard, had won a Rhodes scholarship, and would later work for the Central Intelligence Agency. Roosevelt was the first army official to recognize that Siblini’s talents could be used to promote American interests in the Middle East against Nazi Germany during the war and, later, against France. The younger Roosevelt sent memoranda to Washington highlighting Siblini, the first of which was a proposal to write a story on Siblini for an American magazine. In these memoranda, Roosevelt argued that the U.S. should hold a greater presence in the Arab world than had ever before been contemplated.6

The proposal to write a magazine story on Siblini, which was censored because it revealed information deemed critical to U.S. military operations, provides the most thoroughgoing account in existence of Siblini and how he contributed to U.S. interests in North Africa.7 Roosevelt notes that, from the moment Siblini landed, he impressed Moroccans and was an indispensible intermediary between the Americans and Moroccans. Remarkably, a day after chatting in Arabic with children on the beach where the Americans had recently landed in Morocco, various local dignitaries arrived bearing gifts of fruit, eggs, and chickens specifically for Siblini.8

As Allied military forces conquered Rabat and Casablanca, American soldiers and officers, who already had a healthy respect for Siblini’s knowledge and linguistic abilities, came to treat him with awe. They recognized that he had the skills to secure provisions at reasonable rates and also to establish ties with the Moroccan elites, few of whom knew English or had met Americans before.7 Roosevelt notes that one figure from a section of Casablanca called Fedala clearly articulated his preference for Siblini, still just a private, over much higher-ranking U.S. officers:

Even the tough, West Point battalion commander began to treat Siblini with what one could almost call deference – especially after a portly, white-turbaned figure with a flowing beard drove up in a coach, announced himself as the Caid of
Following his reading of the Qur’an for the sultan, Moroccan authorities requested that Siblini regularly read the Qur’an on Moroccan radio, and his Sunday night Qur’anic broadcasts became popular throughout the kingdom. His presence on Moroccan radio was even featured in an article by the New York Times. In the broadcasts, Siblini consciously picked passages from the Qur’an that condemned undemocratic action, preached the equality of all races, and promised divine retribution against arrogant and tyrannical figures who fought against the will of God. While he did not mention Nazis and their allies by name, he intended Arab audiences to contrast Nazi ideas with the principles of Islam and other religions in the Arab world.

Siblini’s popularity and public profile, however, raised a problem for U.S. diplomats and senior officers: despite his public appearances and audiences with U.S. and Moroccan elites, he was still a private, the lowest rank in the U.S. army. Moroccans frequently asked about the symbols on his and his colleagues’ uniforms and expressed great bewilderment to U.S. generals that Siblini was only a private despite his religious education and lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Fearing that Moroccans might eventually conclude that he had been blocked for promotion because of his religion, U.S. officers took the highly unusual step of petitioning for Siblini to become a commissioned officer in the army immediately because of his unique abilities and contributions. Siblini was eventually commissioned as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army in early 1943. Later that same year, he married the eighteen-year-old daughter of a leading Muslim doctor in Rabat, Aisha al-Shukri.

By that time, commanders in Allied headquarters in North Africa were aware of Siblini and requested that he do radio broadcasts from Algeria’s capital, Algiers, from which he could reach audiences throughout the Arab world. They understood that his presence alone was “excellent propaganda for the allied cause – that he was a living illustration that America is a refuge for all races and creeds – and that all are treated alike.” It reinforced pamphlets that showed American Muslims freely practicing their faith and radio programs that highlighted Siblini and other Arabs who were succeeding in America’s armed forces and in American life.
Even more importantly, Siblini’s broadcasts, which were grounded in the Qur’an and in Islam, undermined Axis radio propaganda that contrasted German and Italian respect for Islam with that of the Allies. For instance, a December 1942 Italian broadcast touched on the following year’s Hajj:

The much vaunted freedom of religion the Allies hope to establish is clearly a farce . . . The British have prevented the Hindu Muslims from going to Mecca because they are afraid that they will divulge to their Arab brothers British atrocities in India. The [Axis] powers, however, have told all [Muslims] that they are free to sail to Mecca, as long as they don’t indulge in war activities.25

These types of broadcasts were widely accessible throughout the Muslim world, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf, and were a key part of the Axis’s strategy in the Middle East. It was hoped that they would turn Arab public opinion against the Allies, stretch the resources of the powerful British navy in the Mediterranean, and limit Anglo-American access to both the oil supplies and to strategic air and naval bases in the Middle East.26

By challenging the message of these broadcasts, Siblini earned powerful enemies. Even before Siblini arrived in Algiers, the head of German propaganda Goebbels dispatched agents to Lebanon to find information about Siblini and his family. And Axis radio stations twice ran stories that focused on Siblini, suggesting that he was a fraud and arguing that nobody in either Lebanon or Syria had heard of him. The stories also questioned his claims to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. There is no evidence that anybody in the Arab world viewed these stories as legitimate or anything more than German propaganda. Roosevelt reports that Siblini and his family’s reputations were sufficiently well-known in the Arab world that Goebbels’s attacks on them were doomed to failure.27

While living in Algiers, Siblini made even more extensive and valuable contacts than he had made in Morocco. He frequently met in public near the Algiers esplanade with aristocrats of Turkish heritage, Western-trained intelligentsia and nationalists, tribal chieftains from Algeria’s Kabyle Mountains, dark-skinned merchants from deep in the Sahara desert, leading Muslim religious figures, and Tunisian royalty.28 Not only did Siblini draw the continued attention of the German government, but his actions and associations were closely monitored by the intelligence service of France. Although the French shared America’s war aims, Georges Pâques and his colleagues viewed Siblini (and later, members of the Roosevelt family in general) with great suspicion and feared that their actions undermined France’s position in North Africa.29 In September 1943, Commandant Ben Daoud, a Muslim French intelligence officer, called Siblini into a meeting at French intelligence headquarters and made it clear that the French monitored Siblini’s actions, as well as his (and Roosevelt’s) most confidential communications with Washington.30

Although Siblini and Roosevelt had drawn the attention of the French and the Germans, they encountered far greater difficulty getting the sustained attention of senior U.S. officials in Washington. In a series of memoranda sent to the Office of War Information, the State Department, and the White House, Roosevelt and Siblini alerted officials in Washington to French mismanagement in North Africa and to the widespread unease among the region’s Muslim population. In one extensive memorandum, Roosevelt provided extensive statistics and anecdotes to illustrate the pitiful state of the economy, social development, and modern education in North Africa. Roosevelt noted that the population of the region had a low opinion of France, saw its culture as “decadent,” and was looking for new friends and would turn to anyone – Berlin, London, Moscow, or Washington – willing to help them. While acknowledging the sensitivity of the situation and French interests, he argued that Washington had to act in North Africa, if only to prevent nations with ideological agendas potentially hostile to the United States (like the Soviet Union) from gaining a foothold in the region.31

Siblini and Roosevelt also presented their superiors in Washington with an aggressive plan of action – a plan of action they had already discussed with their contacts in North Africa. They asked for funds and permission to produce a series of albums featuring Siblini reading the Qur’an and commenting on other religious themes in Arabic.32 They also suggested that the U.S. government dub American movies into Arabic and French and distribute them throughout North Africa. In addition, they proposed that the U.S. military seize a radio transmitter in southern Italy known as Radio Bari.
which could be heard clearly throughout the Arab world. They saw it as the perfect place for Washington to project its message into the Middle East and to combat Axis (and Soviet and French) propaganda in the Mediterranean region. Citing the successes of American educational institutions in Beirut, Cairo, and Istanbul, Roosevelt proposed establishing American universities in North Africa to meet the demand for modern education there.

But their most ambitious proposal involved the 1943 Hajj. Roosevelt and Siblini proposed, with the blessing of the American legation in Tangier, that U.S. planes fly prominent North African Muslims to Jeddah for the Hajj. The group would include religious figures, the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis, as well as Algerian notables. They would fly to Egypt, then on to the Hijaz, and return to North Africa with official visits to Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, and Jerusalem. Siblini would lead the expedition and would be accompanied by a Tangiers film-maker, who had already produced a successful film about the Hajj and would make a film about the trip for distribution by the U.S. government. Because of France’s poor reputation in North Africa, it was imperative that the French not participate in the airlift.

Siblini and Roosevelt understood the radical nature of their proposal. The United States had never undertaken such a mission, had limited diplomatic representation in Saudi Arabia, and its experience with the Hajj was limited to Filipino Muslim pilgrims. They argued that all the warring powers in World War II would furnish transportation to Muslims and safe transit to them to win support among the global Muslim community. There would certainly be Axis agents among the Muslim pilgrims who would spread negative rumors about the United States – rumors that would be far less believable if there was a prominent U.S.-led delegation at the Hajj. The official delegation would also show that the United States had not forgotten Muslims or their faith, and that they were well represented in America. And Siblini already had evidence that the operation could be very important: Commandant Daoud had contacted Siblini and ordered him to change his proposal. He had demanded that any U.S.-funded Hajj pilgrims travel by land or sea, and not by air. It was clear to the Americans in Algiers that French Intelligence was terrified about the psychological impact of a U.S. airlift of Hajj pilgrims; they also had demanded that U.S. officials remove Siblini from North Africa.

French fears about a U.S.-funded Hajj airlift, however, were greatly exaggerated. Wallace Murray, the head of the Africa and Near Eastern Division at the U.S. State Department, and other senior officials in Washington, refused to fly pilgrims from North Africa to Saudi Arabia. They told Roosevelt and Siblini that U.S. assistance was impractical politically, and that air travel was inconsistent with Muslim ideals of suffering while on the Hajj. In their eyes, North Africa was squarely in France’s sphere of influence, while Saudi Arabia lay within Great Britain’s sphere. It was up to London and Paris to address problems in those areas. What’s more, a French delegation paid for by prominent Free French Generals Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle planned to fly a group of prominent African Muslims to Mecca in 1943. There was no need to replicate French operations in wartime or anger a key ally in the war.

Furthermore, Murray observed, the American oil consortium in Saudi Arabia (the Arabian-American Oil Company, or ARAMCO), had won its contract in the kingdom to explore for oil precisely because the United States lacked influence there, and Americans were not seen as a threat to its independence. If the U.S. government were to become more involved in Saudi Arabia or the Hajj in the future, even larger oil concessions in the region might go to the United States’ competitors. Why take the risk?

As disappointing as Murray’s refusal to support the airlift was to Roosevelt and Siblini, they took solace from the fact that their vision of U.S. involvement in North Africa and the Middle East was gaining ground (and giving Pâques legitimate grounds for concern). Already, at the Allied Casablanca Conference in January 1943, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had held a party for Muhammad V and publicly backed Moroccan aspirations for independence. Such pledges laid the groundwork for close ties with Muhammad V during the Cold War after Morocco ended its colonial relationship with France in the 1950s. At the same time, Washington formed an even stronger relationship with Saudi Arabia. In 1945 – two years after Murray rejected the proposed Hajj Airlift – British diplomats observed that Americans were building their own “empire in the Kingdom” – and they were not intent on sharing with anyone, especially the British.
After the onset of the Cold War in the Middle East, U.S. officials adopted many of the strategies that Roosevelt and Siblini had pioneered in North Africa during the war. To counter Soviet propaganda and the animosity generated by U.S. recognition of Israel, U.S. officials sought to convince Arabs and others of American military power and the benefits of what British diplomats termed “the baubles of American civilization – Coca-Cola, Cadillacs, and the rest.” U.S. embassies made available American movies and other media to Arabs in much the same way that Roosevelt and Siblini had suggested during 1942 and 1943. When 4,000 Muslim pilgrims were left stranded in Beirut in 1952 days before the start of the Hajj, Washington dispatched their air force to fly the pilgrims to Saudi Arabia in time to meet their religious obligations. The U.S. government even made a film about the operation for use by American embassies in the Middle East and the wider Muslim world.

Roosevelt remained in U.S. intelligence after the war, and had a long career with the Central Intelligence Agency and later as an international banker and consultant. Siblini returned to relative anonymity after the war, and died in 2002. One is hard-pressed to find a passing mention of Siblini in the voluminous body of work on Operation Torch or on U.S. military relations in North Africa and the Middle East during World War II. The official history of the U.S. Army division he served in while in Morocco – the Third Infantry Division – only lists him as a private first class and does not touch on his contributions to the division’s successes in North Africa. Had Roosevelt not written about his experiences with Siblini in North Africa during World War II in his memoirs, Siblini’s contributions might have been lost to history.

But none of these facts diminishes Siblini’s contributions to Arab-American relations in the twenty-first century. He decisively shows how factors seen in conflict or at war in the twenty-first century – the Arab World, Islam, and America – came together to improve the standing of the United States and to defeat a powerful threat to world peace, Nazism. His success also shows us how a deep and intelligently sympathetic understanding of Islam and of Arab culture produced enormous benefits for U.S. interests generally in the Middle East and could do so again in the future. Forgotten or not, Muhammad Siblini deserves to be remembered for what he is: an American hero who fostered both positive and creative exchanges between America and the Middle East.

Notes
2. Ibid.
4. Archie Roosevelt, For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer (Boston and London: Little, Brown, and Company, 1988), 50. Siblini was the only one of the Arabs who was not Christian.
9. Ibid., 6. Roosevelt reports that Siblini regularly secured rates for American soldiers that were a half, a third, or quarter of the original prices.
10. Ibid., 5.
11. Ibid., 5–6.
12. Roosevelt, For Lust of Knowing, 67.
15. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 10.
19. Ibid., 11.
22. Ibid., 11.
23. A good example of such material can be found in Alexander Alland, American Counterpoint (New York: The John Day Company, 1943). It included pictures of American Muslims freely praying in the United States.

24. Farris to Cranston, “Arabic Releases and Domestic Reports,” 17 December 1943, Records of the Office of War Information (OWI), OWI Overseas Branch, Bureau Of Overseas Intelligence, Central Files, Information Files on the Mediterranean, Af Reg 1941-1945, Box 430, U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Farris notes that the day’s radio broadcasts featured a specific story (in Arabic) on Arab Americans who had distinguished themselves in the U.S. armed forces.

25. Farris to Brown, “Axis Broadcasts to North Africa From December 3 to December 14,” for more on this issue, see Jeffrey Herf, Roosevelt, “Mohamed Siblini,” 12.


27. For more on this issue, see Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (Ann Arbor, MI: Sheridan Books, 2009), 8-13 and 32-35.


29. French mistrust of Roosevelt even included other members of his extended family, such as President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's son, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt. After Elliott Roosevelt met with the Bey of Tunis in June 1943, French officials reportedly spread a story among elite and popular circles in Tunisia that Roosevelt had treated the Bey “like the chief of a negro tribe” and spoke to him in a “debonair fashion, with his legs crossed.” The French reportedly added that Roosevelt had further insulted the Bey by offering him a package of cigarettes and a bar of chocolate. “Visit of Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt to the Bey of Tunis,” N.D., Archibald Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box I:3, Folder 3.8.


36. Roosevelt, For Lust of Knowing, 117.


38. Ibid.


40. Ibid.


42. By the late 1940s, Siblini had established a business on 76 Reade Street in New York City.

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