Connections and Ruptures: America and the Middle East

Proceedings of the Third International Conference Sponsored by The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud Center for American Studies and Research at the American University of Beirut

Robert Myers
Editor

Nancy Batakji Sanyoura
Associate Editor

Gabriel Magro, Eman El Ahmar, Jennifer Moganam, and Maria Makarem
Editorial Assistants

2011

1866 AUB

40 Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in *Culture, Globalization and the World-system: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, ed. Anthony D. King (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 32.

41 Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflecions on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," *American Anthropologist*, Volume 104, Number 3, (2002) and Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim* (2004).

42 Steven Salaita, "Ethnic Identity and Imperative Patriotism: Arab Americans Before and After 9/11," *College Literature*, Volume 32, Number 2, Spring (2005): 151-152

43 Melani McAlister, A Cultural History of the War without End, *The Journal of American History*, Volume 89, Issue 2 (2002): 439-455.

44 Wendy Brown, *Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (Prnceton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 46.

45 Ibid, 95.

46 Hall, "The Local and the Global," 28.

47 Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," 70.

48 Susan E. Babbitt, "Objectivity and the Role of Bias." In *Engendering Rationalities*, ed Nancy Tuana and Sandra Morgen (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), 298.

49 Ibid, 302.

50 Interview with Sanaa, October 13 2008.

51 Interview with Latifah, October 16 2008.

52 Lisa Suhair Majaj, "New Directions: Arab American Writing Today" in *ArabAmericas: Literary Entanglements of the American Hemisphere and the Arab World*, eds. Ottmar Ette and Friederike Pannewick (Frankfurt: Vervuet, 2006), 325.

53 Interview with Sanaa, October 13 2008.

54 http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=163395,00.html

55 All of Interfaith Organization's meetings are noted and available to download on the group's web site.

56 Salaita, "Curricular Activism and Academic Freedom," 2008.

57 Hayan Charara ed, "Introduction" in *Inclined to Speak: an Anthology of Contemporary Arab American Poetry* (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 2008), xxix.

Airlift for Allah: The United States and the 1952 *Hajj*

Sean Foley
Middle Tennessee State University

In 1952 the US Air Force flew approximately 4,000 Muslims from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia in just four days. Virtually unknown today, the "Airlift for Allah" symbolizes both a key shift in U.S. policy toward the Middle East and the ability of American leaders to think quickly in response to an emergency request for assistance from the governments of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. Ironically, nine years earlier the State Department had rejected a plan by U.S. diplomats and intelligence officers in North Africa for a similar airlift. At that time, U.S. officials argued that air travel was inconsistent with Muslim ideals of suffering while on the *hajj* and that Saudi Arabia was within Great Britain's sphere of influence. They also worried that some Saudis would view a *hajj* airlift as a threat to their national sovereignty and would use it as an excuse to limit future U.S. access to Saudi Arabia's oil reserves.

The stark difference between the reactions of American officials in 1943 and 1952 in response to a request to assist Muslim pilgrims provides an important window into the evolution of U.S. polices in the Middle East during the early Cold War. The *hajj* airlift also shows us that U.S.'s historical ties with Saudi Arabia include important aspects that are not tied to petroleum or to militant Islam. The *hajj* airlift is an important historical event that—like the more famous Berlin Airlift—helps us better understand American foreign policy at a critical juncture in the nation's history.

In late August 1952, Edward Debbas, the head of Lebanon's international airport and the interim head of the country's airline authority, faced a daunting challenge. He had to figure out how to transport thousands of *hajj* pilgrims camped at the still unfinished international airport in Beirut to Mecca only a week before the start of the *hajj*.[1] These individuals were among the tens of thousands of additional pilgrims who had decided to go on the *hajj* in 1952 when Saudi Arabia eliminated pilgrimage dues. Turkey's government allowed

its citizens to make the pilgrimage for the first time since the 1920s, and international health officials confirmed that the plague would not threaten visitors to Mecca and Medina.[2] Significantly, government officials, airlines, and transport companies had made no provisions for the additional pilgrims, since it was widely assumed that the announcement of the reduction in fees had been made public far too late for anyone to benefit from it during the 1952 *hajj*. Indeed, in May 1952 when Saudi Arabia publicly announced the elimination of the *hajj* fees, U.S. diplomats reported that "most of the Moslem countries or countries containing Moslems had long since decided on their pilgrimage quotas and had completed transportation arrangements."[3]

As the sea and land routes to Mecca became overwhelmed with pilgrims, thousands went to Beirut, which had air service to Jeddah, the traditional gateway to Mecca. Few of the pilgrims had the resources to stay in Beirut for longer than a couple of days, and as few as 20 percent of them knew Arabic.[4] Even fewer knew Lebanon's other major language, French.[5] Among the many dignitaries at Beirut's airport was Ayatollah Sayyed Abdul Ghasem Kashani, the Speaker of the Iranian parliament and a fierce critic of U.S. policy in the Middle East. King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia personally promised Kashani that he would travel to Jeddah by a special plane from Beirut, and so the Ayatollah, along with all of the other pilgrims, arrived at the airport with ticket in hand.[6]

Initially, the ten daily DC-3 flights flown by Air Liban, Middle East Airlines, and Saudi Arabian Airlines could handle the travelers wishing to go to Jeddah. But as thousands of pilgrims arrived at the airport, it became clear what had happened: the airlines had oversold tickets, in part because of a dispute between Lebanese and Saudi airlines over how to the divide profits and fly pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. Neither Britain nor France were in a position to extend state support—even though they had transported stranded *hajj* pilgrims in Lebanon in the past and had received considerable praise for their assistance in the Muslim world.[7] American and European airlines refused Debbas' urgent appeals for aid, insisting "that all their planes were required for existing commitments, that longer notice would have been needed, and besides, ferrying pilgrims did not offer much commercial incentive."[8] As the deadline for the *hajj* loomed, pilgrims began to fear that they would never make it and asked increasingly angry questions about when they could go to Jeddah.

Airlift for Allah: The United States and the 1952 Hajj

With days left before the start of the *hajj*, Debbas suggested to the Lebanese Foreign Affairs Ministry that it ask the U.S. government for assistance. After the Saudi government approved Debbas' idea, the Lebanese foreign minister asked the U.S. minister to Lebanon, Harold Minor, for immediate help.[9] Debbas himself also asked Minor directly for help, and his request may have been decisive. Not only was Debbas a graduate of the American University of Beirut, he had also spent several years in the United States on a U.S. Department of State scholarship program that was a precursor to the Fulbright program.[10] While in the United States, Debbas earned graduate degrees in aeronautical engineering at Lehigh University and at Harvard University and worked in a parking meter manufacturing plant in southern Illinois.[11] Many in the U.S. community in Lebanon in 1952 knew Debbas personally, and one observed in a letter home that Debbas spoke English with "an American accent" and "had the American enthusiasm for doing challenging things quickly and well."[12] Among Debbas' American friends was Minor, whom he regularly visited at his home in Beirut.

As Minor contemplated the request for U.S. assistance, he certainly remembered that it was not the first time that Washington had lent assistance to Saudi Arabia's *hajj*, nor was it the first time that the U.S. government had contemplated using airplanes to ferry pilgrims to Jeddah.

When Minor worked in the Division of Middle Eastern Affairs in the State Department during World War II,[13] there had been several proposals for the United States to facilitate the *hajj*, most prominently in 1943. At that time, Archibald Roosevelt, who was an intelligence officer in North Africa, proposed—with the blessing of the U.S. legation in Tangier—that a U.S. plane fly prominent North African Muslims to Jeddah for the *hajj*.[14] Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt and the cousin of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, thought this project would be a goodwill gesture that would also counteract a Free French airlift of notable African Muslim pilgrims.[15] He had built close ties to nationalists in North Africa and had already begun to think of a post-war period in which the United States would compete with France and other powers for influence in Africa and the Arab world.[16] In addition, Prince Faysal and his father, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, lobbied U.S. officials in Washington and Saudi Arabia for U.S. financial assistance and modern transportation for the pilgrims.[17]

Although Great Britain readily provided assistance for that 1943 *hajj*, receiving prominent mention for it in Ibn Saud's annual *hajj* speech, Wallace Murray, the head of the Middle Eastern Division, and other senior State Department officials refused to assist Saudi Arabia. They told Archibald Roosevelt that U.S. assistance was impractical politically and that air travel was inconsistent with Muslim ideals of suffering while on the *hajj*. Furthermore, Murray observed, the American oil consortium in Saudi Arabia (the Arab-American Oil Company, or ARAMCO), had won its contract in the kingdom to explore for oil precisely because the United States *lacked* influence in the kingdom, and therefore Americans were not seen as a threat to its independence. If the U.S. government were to become more involved in Saudi Arabia or its neighbors in the future, even larger oil concessions in the region might go to the United States' competitors. Why take the risk?[18]

For Archibald Roosevelt, Murray's refusal in 1943 to support the proposed *hajj* airlift was a rare setback in a long career in international affairs, and his vision of U.S. involvement in the Middle East gained ground among senior U.S. officials after World War II and the start of the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union. As Robert Vitalis observes in *America's Kingdom*, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson convinced President Truman of the centrality of Saudi Arabia and its vast oil reserves to U.S. national security in 1945—just two years after Murray refused to support the *hajj* airlift.[19] Saudi Arabia was now too vital a nation to be left to Great Britain, and U.S. officials increasingly wielded influence indirectly as advisors to independent Saudi government departments.[20] A key additional element was ARAMCO. Company officials consistently blurred the lines between Saudi interests and those of the company, which was, for all practical purposes, a sovereign, independent entity operating within Saudi Arabia.[21] In the words of British diplomats, who knew what an empire looked like, Americans were building their own "empire in the Kingdom"—and they were not intent on sharing with anyone, especially the British.[22]

Throughout the rest of the Truman Administration, the United States' role also grew substantially in the rest of the Middle East. The U.S. government extended Marshall Plan support for Turkey and Greece in 1947, mediated Tehran's dispute with London over the nationalization of Iranian oil, and recognized the independence of Jewish populations in Palestine during the 1948

Arab-Israeli War. To counter Soviet propaganda and the animosity generated by its recognition of Israel, U.S. officials sought to convince Arabs and others of American military power and the benefits of what British diplomats termed "the baubles of American civilization—Coca-Cola, Cadillacs, and the rest."[23] The U.S. Air Force was critical to these psychological operations and had already proven its use in Germany. In 1948 and 1949, the U.S. Air Force had delivered over 2.3 million tons of humanitarian assistance to Berlin and, in the process, had effectively "defeated the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin's Allied sector."[24]

Within this context, it should come as no surprise that Harold Minor in 1952 had already tried to secure alternative transportation for the *hajj* pilgrims before meeting with Lebanese officials and was an enthusiastic supporter of Debbas' proposal to airlift them to Saudi Arabia. After meeting with the Lebanese, he sent an overnight telegram to Henry Byroade—the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs—recommending U.S. assistance via military aircraft as a goodwill gesture.[25] Byroade welcomed Minor's idea and forwarded it to the Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas Finletter, and to the Secretary of Defense, Robert Lovett. Finletter and Lovett supported the operation with the condition that it was clear to everyone that the United States government would not accept any payment for pilgrim flights to Jeddah.[26]

A day after Minor made his request, thirteen U.S. C-54 military transport planes arrived at Beirut's airport.[27] U.S. Air Force officials sought to use the airlift as a training exercise and sent seasoned officers and pilots who had participated in the Berlin airlift. They also sent dozens of flight, operation, maintenance, traffic, and cleaning crews to work with Debbas and other Lebanese airport employees. When Debbas told the *hajj* pilgrims that the Americans would fly them to Jeddah, many shouted with joy, "Praise Allah; praise America."[28]

For the next four days, a C-54 took off every hour from Beirut for the ten-hour round trip. Lebanese and U.S. personnel devised a system of rope sequencing which allowed groups of 80 pilgrims at a time to be quickly loaded onto U.S. aircraft.[29] U.S. and Lebanese crews undertook grueling twelve-hour shifts. No additional commercial airline tickets were sold.[30] U.S. planes carried as many pilgrims in four days as the local airlines had

carried in three weeks, and each *hajj* pilgrim received a lunch courtesy of the American Friends of the Middle East.[31] Each pilgrim in Beirut who already had a ticket for Jeddah arrived safely, with the last plane landing only hours before the *hajj* was to officially start. The Saudi government did its part too, granting the United States Air Force full access to its airfields and extending the *hajj* deadline a day to facilitate the pilgrims stranded in Lebanon.[32] In addition, U.S. C-54 planes were sent to Iraq to pick up 300 stranded pilgrims in Baghdad.[33]

Time and *Life* magazines and the *New York Times* ran glowing stories on the *hajj* airlift. *Time* in particular highlighted the fact that the senior Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Kashani, kissed the cheeks of both the pilot, Alfred Beasley, and his co-pilot, Angelo Elmo, upon arriving in Jeddah.[34] Only a year later, Kashani supported the U.S.-sponsored coup that toppled Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadeq and established Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's royal "dictatorship" in Iran. [35]

Nor was the positive publicity from the airlift limited to Iran. Lebanon's *mufti*, Muhammad Alaya, told Minor that Muslims must include the U.S. people, "infidels though they are," in their prayers.[36] A Turkish pilgrim cabled his nation's prime minister and president: "The Beirut-Jedda air-bridge constitutes real international cooperation. At no time in history has so much help been offered from so far away and for such a large number of people in such a noble cause. Muslims, the whole world over and this year's pilgrims in particular, will not forget this gesture."[37] Lebanese newspapers were equally supportive of the *hajj* airlift. One newspaper, *al-Massa*, asked "Is it not wonderful that American air force planes carry pilgrims to Mecca? Has America at last found God's way?"[38] The *New York Times* reported that one Beirut newspaper commented that "while the United States had given Israel material aid, it had given the Arabs spiritual aid—'a far greater gift than was given Israel.'"[39]

British officials coldly reported that the airlift "added much to American prestige" in Saudi Arabia at London's expense.[40] The U.S. Defense Department concurred with this assessment of the operation and noted that the airlift was the most cost effective action undertaken in years to win support for U.S. policies in the Middle East and the broader Muslim world.[41] U.S. Air Force pilots told Minor that the Mecca airlift "was tougher and more

hazardous" than the Berlin airlift "but equally important."[42] In the eyes of U.S. diplomats and scholars in Lebanon, the *hajj* airlift displayed the "power and organizational ability of the United States in the best possible way."[43]

Still, perhaps no people were more impressed than the Saudis, especially the man charged with administering the *hajj*, Prince Faysal. He had much at stake in the *hajj*, since the previous year the *hajj* had been a disaster and a great embarrassment for the kingdom, which defined itself at home and abroad as the protector of Mecca, Medina, and the pilgrimage. In fact, British diplomats referred to the 1951 *hajj* as the "holocaust," because 5,000 to 7,000 pilgrims had died from heatstroke.[44] Even Faysal's father, King Ibn Saud, had only escaped death from heatstroke because his guards promptly covered him with ice.[45]

In 1952, however, the *hajj* went off smoothly. Pilots in the United States Air Force, as well as some working for ARAMCO, flew pilgrims to Jeddah and directly to Mecca in American planes. In addition, American-supplied trucks moved pilgrims from Jeddah to Mecca on roads constructed by Bechtel, the American engineering firm. The U.S. government had acted in Saudi Arabia's time of need, sparing Faysal and his government considerable humiliation during the most important event of the year for Saudis. This response was one that the Saudi royal family would not forget, and in gratitude they provided traditional robes, *keffiyes*, and royal headbands to each American who had participated in the 1952 *hajj* airlift.[46] The basis was established for a partnership that would grow even closer and which continues to define the political landscape in the Middle East to this day.

In the months immediately after the 1952 airlift, State Department officials discussed using the proceeds from the unused tickets sold to the airlines (approximately $260,000) to fund Muslim cultural exchange programs and a center for Muslim pilgrims in Jeddah or Beirut. Other suggestions included funding scholarship programs for needy Muslims, providing tents and other materials for Arab refugees, and holding academic conferences on the Middle East and the Islamic world.[47] Unfortunately, none of these ideas were adopted. Washington found that it was easier (and more politically expedient) to donate the $260,000 to the Lebanese Muslim Welfare Committee to build a pilgrimage center in Beirut. For reasons that remain unclear to this day, the pilgrimage center was never built, and it is not clear what the money from the airlift was ultimately used for.[48]

In June 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent a telegram to US posts throughout the Muslim world stating that under no circumstances would Washington be involved in another *Hajj* airlift.[49] While Dulles did not explain why he chose not to renew the mission, he may have wished to avoid the possibility that the Lebanese (and others) might assume that they could depend on annual US assistance with the *Hajj*. He might have also believed that it violated the First Amendment of the U.S. constitution, which bans official support for organized religion. Here it is worth noting that the airlift was not a normal humanitarian operation, but a special case in which the U.S. government—by flying pilgrims to Saudi Arabia as opposed to their homes—could be seen as using official funds to promote a specific religion (in this case Islam). The operation could thus be seen as a violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and it is conceivable that First Amendment organizations would initiate legal action in American courts if a similar *hajj* airlift were to be undertaken today. Whether such a legal case would override the humanitarian and foreign policy concerns related to the airlift in American courts is a different matter.

Whatever Dulles' reasons may have been, by the end of the 1950s the 1952 *hajj* airlift had completely disappeared from public consciousness and was not longer a tool of public diplomacy. One is hard pressed to find even a passing mention of the *hajj* airlift in the substantial body of scholarship on U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia or U.S. involvement in the Middle East that has been produced over the past sixty years. My monograph, *The Arab Gulf States: Beyond Oil and Islam*, which discusses the role of the 1952 airlift and the *hajj* generally within the history and politics of Saudi Arabia and its neighbors in the Gulf, seeks to remedy this situation.

The *h*ajj airlift provides Americans and others with two lessons for public diplomacy that are important today, especially in light of President Obama's renewed emphasis on public diplomacy with the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. First, if Americans retain flexible conceptions of public diplomacy and take advantage of opportunities quickly, they can achieve significant diplomatic successes. Second, if Americans do not follow up on public diplomacy successes, such successes may disappear from public consciousness and be of little value to us as a tool of statecraft. It is in fact one of the primary tasks of the historian to keep such small but significant events from vanishing.

Airlift for Allah: The United States and the 1952 Hajj

Notes

1 "US Is the Pilgrim's Friend In Need," *Life Magazine*, September 8, 1952, 29–31; Nick Nolte to Walter S. Rogers, "Operation Hajj," September 5, 1952, Institute of Current World Affairs Collection of Letters, RHN–45, 2 (available at http://www.icwa.org/).

2 "Tidings for the Muslims: Royal Decree of the Canceling of Pilgrimage Dues," *Um al-Qura*, May 23, 1952, 5; Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 2–3; Carp, US Consulate Istanbul to Washington, "Pilgrimage to Mecca," no. 174, September 16, 1952, reprinted in Alan de Lacy Rush, ed., *Records of the Hajj: A Documentary History of the Pilgrimage to Mecca*, vol. 8, The Saudi Period (Since 1952) (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Archive Editions, 1993), 100–103.

3 Hare, "Pilgrimage Dues Abolished by His Majesty the King," US Embassy Jidda to Washington, No. 345, June 3, 1952, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, The Saudi Period, 11-12.

4 Edward Debbas, in discussion with the author, October 17, 2009.

5 Ibid.

6 Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 5.

7 Amin Nadim to the British Embassy in Beirut, "British Help for the Transport of Muslim Pilgrims," January 20, 1952, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, The Saudi Period, 31-33.

8 Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 3.

9 Edward Debbas, in discussion with the author, October 17, 2009.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 3.

13 "Harold B. Minor, U.S. Envoy To Lebanon in Early 1950's," *Associated Press*, January 28, 1984.

14 Kirk, US Legation Cairo to Washington, no. 1540, August 27, 1943, reprinted in United States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944 (Washington, DC: National Archives, National Records and Archives Service, General Services Administration, 1974), Reel 5; Hull, Washington to US Consul Algiers, no. 890, September 8, 1943, reprinted in United States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944, Reel 5; Murray to Berle and Dunn, US Department of State, October 2, 1943, reprinted in United States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944, Reel 5; Murray, US Department of State, "Memorandum of Conversation—Arthur Sweetser and Wallace Murray: Proposed Pilgrimage to Mecca by Army Transport Planes Carrying the Sultan of Morocco, the Bey of Tunis and High Moslem Ecclesiastics of French North Africa Under the Auspices of the Office of War Information," 890F.404/33, October 2, 1943, reprinted in United States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944, Reel 5.

15 The expedition was funded by a delegation led by French Generals Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle. Wiley, Algiers to Secretary of State, November 2, 1943, reprinted in United Stats Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabi*, 1930–1944,Reel 5; Murphy, Algiers to Secretary of State, A-93, November 18, 1943, reprinted n United States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs f Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944, Reel 5; and Wilson, Algiers to Secretary of State, A-29, no. 120, Decembr 23, 1943, reprinted in United States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relatig to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944, Reel 5.

16 Roosevelt briefly discusses the airlift in his published memoir, *For lust of knowing: memois of an intelligence officer*. It is worth noting that Murray also rejected Roosevelt's 1943 proposal o build an American university in Morocco similar to the American University in Beirut. For more o this period in his life, see Archibald Roosevelt, *For lust of knowing: memoirs of an intelligence offier* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1988), 85-86.

17 US Legation Cairo to Washington, no. 890, October 4, 1943, reprinted in United Stats Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabi*, 1930–1944, Reel 5.

18 Davis to Sweetser, "Proposed Pilgrimage to Mecca," September 28, 1943, reprinted in Unitd States Department of State, *Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Saudi Arabia*, 1930–1944, Reel 5; Murray, "Memorandum of Conversation—Arthur Sweetser and Wallae Murray."

19 Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier* (Palo Alto, C: Stanford University Press, 2007), 265.

20 Pelham to Eden, "Position of America in Saudi Arabia," no. 153, ES 1051/188, reprintd in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidentil Print*, ed. Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, pt. 5: From 1950 through 1956, Series B: Near ard Middle East, ed. Bülent Gökay, vol. 4: *Arabia, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and Jordan,* 1952 (Bethesd, MD: Lexis-Nexis, 2005), 144-148.

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

23 *Ibid.*

24 Walter J. Boyne, "The Pilgrim Airlift," *Air Force Magazine* 90 (3) (March 2007): 81.

25 "Airlift for Allah," Time, September 8, 1952, 34; United States Congress, House Committe on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1958: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affair: House of Representatives, 85th Congress,* 2nd Session (Washington, DC: United States Governmet Printing Office, 1958), 690–691, 824–826.

26 Boyne, "The Pilgrim Airlift," 81.

27 Minor, Embassy Beirut to Washington, "USIS Story on Meccan Airlift," no. 364, Augut 25, 1952, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 53; Boyne, "The Pilgrin Airlift," 82. The US operation included 80 officers and 129 enlisted men.

28 "US Is the Pilgrim's Friend In Need," 31 and Edward Debbas, in discussion with the author, October 17, 2009.

29 Edward Debbas, in discussion with the author, October 17, 2009.

30 Minor, Embassy Beirut to Washington, "Meccan Airlift," no. 422, August 30, 1952, reprinted in *Records of the Hajj, vol. 8, The Saudi Period,* 58; Hare, Embassy Beirut to Washington, "Progress Report on Use of Mecca Airlift Fund," no. 164, September 9, 1954, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 76–77.

31 Reportedly the lunches cost at least $2,000. The American Friends of the Middle East was a front organization for the US Central Intelligence Agency. It was founded in 1951 to facilitate American contacts with pro-Western Arabs. It received funding from the Dearborn Foundation, the same organization that supported the Committee of Correspondence. For more on this organization, see Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 126-127, 137, and 236-247.

32 Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 4; Boyne, "The Pilgrim Airlift," 83.

33 "US Extends Airlift for Mecca Pilgrims," *The New York Times*, August 29, 1952, 6.

34 "Airlift for Allah," 34.

35 Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 275-276 and Nikki Keddie, *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 140.

36 "Airlift for Allah," 34.

37 Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 5.

38 US Embassy Beirut to Secretary of State, no. 369, August 25, 1952, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, The Saudi Period, 54.

39 "Last of Pilgrims Flown Near Mecca," *New York Times*, August 30, 1952, 2.

40 Pelham to Eden, "Annual Report on the Pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hejaz for 1952," no. 21, ES 1781/4, Jeddah, February 2, 1953, reprinted in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print*, ed. Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, pt. 5: *From 1951 Through 1956, Series B: Near and Middle East*, 1953, ed. Bülent Gökay, vol. 6: *Arabia, Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and Jordan,* 1953(Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 2001), 65.

41 William Foster, Deputy U.S. Secretary of Defense, to Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, and Joints Chiefs of Staff, "Psychological Significance of the Mecca Airlift," October 1, 1952. My thanks to the Truman Presidential Library for providing me with a copy of this document.

42 U.S. Embassy Beirut to Secretary of State, no. 411, August 29, 1952, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 56-57.

43 Nolte, "Operation Hajj," 5.

44 Pelham to Eden, "Annual Report on the Pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hejaz for 1952," 62–63.

45 Ibid.

46 Boyne, "The Pilgrim Airlift," 83.

47 Hart (NE) to Cleland (OIR), "Mecca Pilgrim Fund," September 4, 1952, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 60-63.

48 U.S. Embassy Beirut to Secretary of State, no. 1146, December 11, 1952, reprinted in Rush, Records of the Hajj, vol. 8, The Saudi Period,69; Hare, US Embassy Beirut to Secretary of State, "Progress Report on Use of Mecca Airlift Fund," no. 164, September 9, 1954, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 76-77; and US Ambassador to Lebanon Donald Heath to H.E. Sa'eb S. Salaam, May 1, 1956, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 79.

49 Dulles to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Posts, "Circular Airgram," no. 851, June 5, 1953, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj, vol. 8, The Saudi Period*, 71; Minor, U.S. Embassy Beirut to Washington, no. 128, July 31, 1953, reprinted in Rush, *Records of the Hajj*, vol. 8, *The Saudi Period*, 73; United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1958, 824–826.

On the Philosophical Foundations of Inter-Cultural Dialogue

Dr. Majeda Omar
The University of Jordan, Jordan

Culture can be defined descriptively as that aspect of human common life "which is socially rather than genetically transmitted."[1] In this sense, it can be argued that culture is relative to a group or a community and varies within this context. While being trans-individual, cultures are not based on agreement; they are independent of social consensus. As products of historical processes, cultures are contingent and adaptable to changing contexts. There are differences both among cultures and within cultures.

The fact that human capacities and values do conflict means that they cannot be fully realized by every culture. It can be argued that no matter how rich a culture may be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Hence, cultures can be regarded as complementing each other, contributing to the mutual enrichments of thought and sharing new perspectives on ways of achieving human fulfillment.

Inter-cultural dialogue is a topic that has widely been examined and extensively discussed. As most, if not all, of us recognize in the course of human life, dialogue is prior to philosophy. However, without an understanding of dialogue, there is no real understanding of philosophy. Hence, a look at the way some philosophers viewed dialogue can assist us in outlining the foundations of inter-cultural dialogue.

Let us go back to Plato, who was always attentive to the historical and social conditions of the dialogue, as he describes the location, the time and the conditions under which his teacher Socrates met with his disciples and dialogue partners. In most of Plato's dialogues, Socrates is the principal speaker and other participants express different points of view. Almost all